TO UNDERSTAND BOSNIA

 

 

 

Bosnia appears today as a melting-pot of government and     administrative structures, whose functioning and interconnections are difficult to understand for those who are not particularly interested in it for professional or study reasons or for mere cultural research.

 

I have therefore deemed convenient to outline a picture of the State of Bosnia- Herzegovina, through  its administrative, institutional and political aspects to allow the reader to understand the essential problems that face the Country and the international Community. I am going to deal with  Bosnia-Herzegovina's political and administrative structures,   mention   the complexity of its various parties and focus on its political, economic and military situation, before concluding with some comments on the various more topical problems.

 

THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES

 

Lets start, first of all, with the introduction of the different flags that wave in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are three of them (Fig.1):

 

• the flag of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), which was imposed (as the currency - the convertible mark KM - the passport and the license plates) by the Civilian High Representative in BiH. The stars represent Europe, the triangle the three ethnic groups and the yellow colour represents the sun.;

• the flag of the Srpska Republic (RS): the cross in the middle is marked by four letters of the Cyrillic alphabet which sum up the motto:0nly Serbia will Save the Serbs;

• the flag of the Bosnia- Herzegovina Federation: the shield represents the Bosnian fleur-de-lys, the Croatian draughtboard and the European flag.

 

The administrative structures are rather complex and derive from the Accords of Dayton, signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, which have put an end to the war.

BiH is a single State, its capital is Sarajevo.

Its organization is formed by two distinct parts called "entities": the Srpska Republic and the BiH Federation (Fig.2).

The BiH Federation assembles essentially two ethnic groups: Bosnian-Moslems  and  the Bosnian-Croatians. Its capital is also Sarajevo.

 

The Srpska Republic is a very homogeneous entity from the ethnic   viewpoint,   almost exclusively peopled by Bosnian- Serbs. Its capital is Banja - Luka.

As regards religion: the Bosnians are Moslem, the Bosnian- Croatians are Roman Catholic and the Bosnian-Serbs are Christian Orthodox.

 

On the local plane, the two entities of Bosnia have the same structures they had before the war.

The Country is divided into 155 municipalities or opstinas: 92 in the Federation and 63 in the SR. Each opstina is distinguished by a number and a name, generally that of the most important locality (Fig.3).

 

The size of an opstina is variable. The Dayton Accords, in 1995, have drawn a line of separation between thè two entities of BiH. This line, the IEBL (Inter-Entity Boundary Line), crosses some opstinas and cuts them in two.

Thus we have witnessed, in 1995, the creation of new opstinas derived from that layout (Fig.3).

Within BiH, the Federation is divided into ten administrative cantons, each of which comprises several opstinas (Fig.4).

A particular case is represented by Mostar, which is the second city of BiH. This    includes    seven municipalities: a "mixed" central zone,  composed by both Bosnian-Moslems and Bosnian- Croatians, and six municipalities: three of Bosnian-Croatians and three of Bosnians (Fig.5). These are directed by a mayor and a council  like  any  classic municipality. The whole is headed by the Mostar City Council, the old council of the city, elected with a proportional system, led by a mayor and a deputy-mayor, who stay in office for two years and belong to the two ethnic groups. Each year, the two representatives exchange their positions.

 

The Srpska Republic is more simple because it does not include cantons and is administratively made up by 63 municipalities (Fig.6). Pale, the fief of Karadzic and the radical Serbs, was the old capital, sadly famous during the civil war. The moderate government of Mrs. Plavsic has transferred the capital in the fief of the moderates, to Banja Luka, in the western part of the Srpska Republic.

A particular attention must given to the strategies position of Brcko. This city, which was under  Serbian administration , has constituted itself, in March2000, a neutral district connected with BiH.

Such decision has for a long , time fuelled the present crisis in the SR, because it' s now cut in two.

 

THE LEGISLATIVE BODIES

 

The legislative and executive powers of BiH are similarly varied (Fig.7). In the SR, the people elect the legislative organs of every opstina and also, directly and with a proportional system, the 83 deputies of the "RSNA", the National Assembly of the SR. The voters elect also the President of the SR and their ethnic representative at the tripartite presidency of BiH.

 

In the BiH Federation the people elect directly the legislative organs of each opstina and of each canton, and the 140 deputies of the "Chamber of Representatives of the BiH Federation". Those elected at cantonal level, in their turn, elect 74 deputies (senators) to the "Chamber of Peoples". These two Chambers   designate   the President.   

The    ethnic representatives of the tripartite Presidency are elected directly by the people.

 

At national level, the peoples of the SR and the BiH Federation elect their deputies to the 'Chamber of Representatives of BiH"; 28 seats for the BiH Federation and 14 seats for the SR.

The senators elected to the “Chamber of Peoples" of the BiH Federation and, the Bosnian- Serbian deputies of the RSNA (National Assembly of SR) elect 5 Deputies for each ethnic group Senators of BiH) to the "Chamber of the Peoples of BiH".

The electors were called to vote in November 2000 to designate the representatives to:

• the Chamber of Representatives of the Federation and to the cantonal assemblies;
• the   Chamber   of   the Representatives of BiH;
• the Presidency and the National Assembly of the SR.

 

In 2002 they will be called again to vote for the tripartite Presidency. It should not be

forgotten that, in April 2000, the same voters had been called to elect the municipal assemblies.

 

THE EXECUTIVE POWER

 

The governments of Bosnia, i.e. of the Federation (including the cantons and the municipalities) and of the SR, implement the principle of tripartition of responsibilities between the national government and the Entities (Fig.8).

The national government is responsible for foreign affairs, currency and finance, citizenship and emigration, communications and transports and also for the enforcement of the international laws on crime.

The governments of the Entities are responsible for Defence (there are in fact different Armed Forces), for the Interior and Justice, for Refugees, for Education, Health, Agriculture and Trade.

 

It should be observed that the national government has no authority over the Entities. The wide autonomy granted to the Entities permits to avoid contrapositions but, at the same time, fosters the separatist temptations of each side, particularly as regards the SR.

This division of responsibilities among the governments risks to be   jeopardized   by   the implementation of the new organization of the Cabinet of BiH voted in mid-April 2000 by the Chamber of Representatives.

The tripartite Presidency, which is at the head of the executive power of Bosnia, is being redefined after the elections of November 2000, the resignation of Izetbegovic and the ousting of the Bosnian-Croatian Ante Jelavic, ordered    by    the    High Representative of the United Nations.

 Also the Cabinet is tripartite .

At national level there are six ministries. All posts are triple. The Prime Minister is also in charge of a ministry with portfolio. The function of Prime Minister is assumed in turn by a Minister of each ethnic group.

The rotation occurs every eight months, together with the Presidency's.

The present government has been approved by the Chamber of the Representatives of Bosnia on 22Febmary2001.

 

In detail, the division of  the power can be summed up as follow :

• the Federation assembles two  ethnic groups. The government posts are double, with the exception of two ministries "without portfolio", which have been created to guarantee balance between Bosnian-Croatians   and   Bosnian- Moslems;

• all posts change the regular holder at the beginning of the year, according to the principle that governs the operation of the power’s of Bosnia’s central government. The present  Cabinet has been appointed or January 2001;

• four ministries are officially located in Mostar.

This transfer is really on theoretical because only the Ministry of Education has recently started to settle in that city. In practice the contacts between the  Minister and his deputy with the Institutions are carried out by phone, because the Institution are often completely separate both physically and ethnically.

At cantonal level, of the ten cantons of the Federation, four are governed by the Bosnians , three by the Bosnian-Croatians and three by mixed governments.

Among these, canton 9 (Sarajevo has witnessed the overwhelming victory of a Moslem majority, but the government is mixed . There are two reasons for this:

• the capital of Bosnia cannot be controlled by a single ethnic group;

• the plurality of canton prevents the Moslems from controlling completely the cantons of the Federation, for lack of an absolute majority.

Each canton has its own government, with a Governor, a Prime Minister and six Ministers.

If the canton is a mixed one, all the posts, including the Governor's and the Prime Minister's, are doubled by a Deputy-Minister's post held by a member of the other ethnic group. Every year the regular holder surrenders his post to his deputy.

The government of a canton has a large autonomy, except for defence.

The mixed cantons are liable to forms of instability, caused by the incessant switching of posts.

At opstina level there is the same structure with a Mayor, a President of the Town Council and a President of the Council of "Ministers".

As regards the Bosnian-Serbian executive power, the President of the Srpska Republic is supported by a Vice-President .

 

The government is led by a Prime Minister and by four Deputy-Prime Ministers, who have also a specific function within the government.

The Prime Minister is appointed by the President and confirmed by the National Assembly of the SR, to which he must submit his government plan.

 

THE POLITICAL PARTIES

 

To synthesize the situation of the political parties in Bosnia is not an easy task(Fig.9). I shall try to review just a very small number of the 250 parties that have been inventoried up to now, without counting the alliances that form and dissolve at will in the municipal, cantonal, federal or national elections, but also between moderate and radicals, within this or that ethnic group, within an Entity or with the neighbouring one .

There are four formations(Fig.10) which dominate Bosnia's political environment:

• Izetbegovic's Bosnian SDA, within thè KCDBiH coalition (or SCDBiH, according to which election): it is the powerful nationalist and religious party in power. Supported by the local Moslem notables, it preaches a unified and "multiethnic" Bosnia. It has only one leader, whose exit from the political, scene could lead, in the short term, to forms of instability within the party itself.

• the Social Democratic Party of BiH (SDP BiH): it was born from the union, in February 1999, of the SDP of Lagumdzjia with the SD BiH of Beslagic.This new party preaches the unity and multiethnicity of Bosnia. The SDP considers itself the successor of the Social Democratic Party founded in 1909. Before the war, it had 70,000 supporters. The fusion gave birth to the second party in the BiH's House of representatives, the only real opposition to SDA.

• Kalinic's   SDS   (Serbian Democratic Party of the SR) is Karadzics and Krajisniks former party. It has been holding a substantial majority for the past two years although it has been downsized after the victory of Plavsic and the SLOGA moderate formation. The SLOGA is a nationalist and conservative party and is very much present in the Pale, Rogatica, Visegrad regions. It favours the "frontality" of the IEBL; however its radical image has faded, although in the last election it got encouraging results, and is now showing an at least apparent inclination to cooperate with the international Community.

   In any case, it remains the first Bosnian-Serbian party.

• Jelavic's   HDZ   (Croatian Democratic Community) is the first Bosnian-Croatian party (there is an HDZ in Croatia as well). Omnipresent in the old Herceg- Bosna, it is now controlled by its Croatian counterpart, which has been headed by Tudjman until his death. The HDZ was founded in 1909 and, like the SDA and the SDS,   is   nationalist   and conservative. Its influence is decreasing and it seems to be hesitating between the promotion of the third Entity and federalism.

A few notes seem to be appropriate in order to clarify some important bonds with parties and coalitions of other neighbouring nations:

• almost all parties are ethnically homogeneous,  even those which preach "multiethnicity";

• as regards Bosnians and Bosnian-Croatians, the first party is predominant and is often a radical formation. Only the SR has a strong opposition, even if it is very young;

• apparently the smaller parties are willing to join forces in order to oppose the large Bosnian and Bosnian-Croatian parties.

 

THE POLITICAL SITUATION

 

Bosnia Herzegovina has entered the new millennium, but there are no indications of a rapid progression towards a moderate government. On the contrary, the same key-characters who took power after the war are still present in government positions, although sometimes in concealed forms. In the Srpska Republic, the attempt made by the moderates, brought to power by the International community, has miserably failed because of the ruinous results of their economic and social policy. The activation of the Institutions after the elections, has given the observers a pessimistic image of both the BiH and  its future, instead of giving rise favourable hopes.

In BiH, the Alliance for Change (AC) could, for the first time, represent an alternative to the monolithic wartime parties; however it must be noted that the AC is made up by many small Parties and its capability of keeping together its various allies while facing the most critical and difficult problems is going to be a very problematic and hard challenge. In this Country, the politicians   have   still   to demonstrate clearly that their absolute priority is the interest of the people.

Four months after the elections, nearly all the institutions of both Bosnia Herzegovina and the Federation are installed, but their structure is questioned by the proposals of some political figures.

Two main tendencies are being discussed: strengthening of the central power or "decentralization" in favour of the constituting elements which would enjoy a significant autonomy.

The spirit of the Dayton Agreements, with the organization of BiH in two entities, clearly favours the latter. The rediscussion of this initial decision has been causing, for several months, the instability of the fragile political balance.

Infringing    the    Dayton Agreements,   the   Bosnian- Croatian National Congress (HNS) wants to impose the constitutional equality of the three "peoples" of BiH, to whom the constitution guarantees their own space within the Federation.

The large majority of the Bosnian-Croatian political parties, representing 90% of the electoral vote, participated in the last congress, held on March 3rd. The public platform provides for a self- proclaimed Croatian government with executive, legislative and judicial powers. Furthermore, the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) demands compliance with the following platform:

• reinstatement of the Bosnian-Croatian Deputies excluded by OSCE after the November 2000 election;

• annulment of all decisions made  in the meantime by the Chambers of the Peoples of both the Federation and of BiH;

• respect by the international Community (High Representative in particular) of the Bosnian- Croatian peoples will.

W.   Petritsch,   the  High Representative in Bosnia, stated that the HDZ' attempt will bring about the ghettoization, isolation and ruin of the Croatian community.

Illegality ,violations of the BiH's Constitution and infringements of the Dayton Agreernents are facts. Nevertheless, the idea of another BiH including several smaller components with equal rights and responsibilities does not look as a completely incoherent basis for negotiations.

In BiH, the Bosnian-Croatians are juridically one of the three constituents of the Bosnian nation, but their living space, little by little, is more and more compromised.

To avoid rediscussing the Dayton Agreements, some provisos of which, after five years, do not seem to meet the present needs, it would be suitable to proceed to an agreed adaptation of some application modalities. This would permit to find a way-out from the present crisis.

W. Petritsch reacted the hard way, relieving Jalevic of his post as Deputy President of BiH, together with several other representatives of the HDZ. This rough action could turn the Bosnian-Croatian deputies into martyrs and symbols of the Croatian cause, legitimizing the demands expressed on behalf of the Croatian people, uniting and mobilizing the Bosnian-Croatians and strengthening the radical elements.

Here one should remember the appraisal made by Jadranko Palic, Foreign Minister of BiH, who pointed  out  the  Croatian intellectuals'        collective dissatisfaction, which, in his opinion, was deeper than could be perceived on the eve of the civil war.

In the Srpska Republic, Dragan Kalinics SDS found its power base among the people, while Prime Minister Milorad Dodik was held responsible for the economic collapse of the SR.

Some hope can be perceived in the appointment of Miaden Ivanic as Chief of the future Government.

Despite the heavy financial burden, Ivanic must succeed in satisfying the international Community without deceiving the expectations of the Bosnian-Serbs, whose main concern is their living-standard.

As regards the international Community,(Fig.11)   the   various organizations (OHR, UNMBiH, UNHCR, OSCE, plus several government- and non-government organizations) often operate in an uncoordinated manner, giving the impression that each one of them pursues its own objectives. This, on some occasions, has led to great mistakes in the employment of resources. Coordination of efforts and ideas is not a trifling matter.

According to the best traditions, the military organizations present in Bosnia under SFORs command appear to be the only well- structured and flexible instrument, capable of meeting the different challenges. The SFOR servicemen often promote initiatives and projects aimed at achieving agreed-upon objectives and are, more and more, a valid and irreplaceable element of connection among the numerous institutions concerned.

 

THE ECONOMY

 

The economy is the only motor capable of producing the resources necessary to implement the reforms, support the people, rebuild the infrastructure, increase the employment, facilitate the return of the refugees and keep the young from leaving the Country.

Bosnia needs help in order to attract foreign investors and change the outlook of the Bosnian Institutions towards market economy.

Many political parties do not function as they should. The power relations take money away from the Institutions and deprive of resources the Government and the people.

It is necessary to create a coordinated    system    of interventions,   capable   of transferring the resources invested by the numerous international organizations, including NGOs, to the realization of a great infrastructure    and    the development of communication systems, rather than distributing generalized aid, with results that are certainly not exciting. The post-war emergency has been largely overcome but is far from resolved.

Sometimes    the    many interventions of reconstruction have not reached a successful conclusion, in that the lawful owners  have not been able to go back to their homes, owing to numerous factors, such as lack of work and of means of subsistence and fear of going back  to an environment where they would belong to a minority (in the most concrete sense of the term), besides the fact that, after eight or nine years, the refugees may have acquired new interests, new friendships and new possibilities of facing everyday life.

The families, frustrated by the lack of a minimum of resources must  be given working and earning opportunities in order to enable them to rebuild their homes in a place that will be chosen by them and not imposed by need or desperation.

The near future will be a troubled one. Growing groups of demonstrators are beginning to demand pay rises or salary arrears vis-a-vis a deteriorating economy. Many do not have a job and those who have one are not paid.

 

THE MILITARY SITUATION

 

Pressed as it is by political and economic  reasons,  Bosnia Herzegovina cannot keep the present structure of the Entities' Armed Forces.(Fig.12) The military balance between the Bosnian- Serbian Army (VRS) and that of the Bosnian Federation (VF), made up by the Bosnian and Bosnian- Croatian components, remains within the agreed proportions. Both Armed Forces are undergoing, a decrease of financial resources with consequent diminished operational   and   combat capabilities. Despite an apparent cooperation in a common defence policy, each Armed Force continues to see the other as a potential threat, owing to a mutual distrust dating back to the brutal civil war of 1992-1995. Bosnia relies strongly on the Stabilization Forces (SFOR) for its security and stability. The Bosnian-Croatians continue to hold out against a complete integration within the Federal Army, afraid that the Bosnians could be dominant in all the integrated structures.

Furthermore,      Croatia's continuous assistance in favour of the Bosnian-Croatian Entity in the Federal Army and that of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in favour of the VRS, albeit declining, complicate all efforts of unification.

The Bosnian-Serbs believe that the integration could threaten the existence of the Srpska Republic and   prefer   a   complete demilitarization (as proposed by Gavrilo Antonie, a member of the National Assembly of the Srpska Republic) to any form of unification. A rapid and forced integration would, among other things, lead to the realization of a non-functional organization and to a kind of legitimating of the paramilitary forces that would certainly sprout in order to provide security to the respective ethnic factions.

In any case, the reduction of the Entities' Armed Forces is a real necessity and is connected with a twofold order of factors:

• realization of numerically reduced Armed Forces, in line with the Country's economic capabilities, in order to ensure, on the one hand, a better mutual trust and, on the other, obtain savings that would be very useful for the economic recovery;

• gradual reduction of the SFOR Forces without jeopardizing their deterrent power.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to solve some basic problems which obstruct the road to a greater mutual trust.

BiH's defence and security policy must be made clear, and a decision has to be made on the existence of the Armed Forces in a Country a little larger than an average Italian region. In short, the question is to decide if the two (but they are actually three) Armed Forces and the three Ministries of BiH should be maintained (also with the international    Community's money) in order to defend Bosnia, or if they must be kept ready to defend   themselves   from threatening or aggressive actions that could come from an Entity within the Country itself.

The different components of the Armed Forces show a certain inclination to dialogue, but are absolutely inflexible (especially on the Serbian side) when it comes to constitute unified Armed Forces. The establishment of a multiethnic central  Command  appears possible, taking for granted that the single structures be divided according   to   the   ethnic differences. Still today there are political discussions on whether the three Ministers of Defence should act and decide as a team or if each Minister should care for the Armed Forces of his ethnic group.

The recent 30% reduction, imposed by the international Community, was not received with great enthusiasm by the militaries, who wanted to keep the status quo in order to avoid the disbandment of several units.

Despite the financial aid and support to concrete projects by the World Bank, the military tried to the last to avoid these cuts, hinting at possible social disorders as a consequence of a rise in the already high rate of unemployment deriving from the discharge of the regular servicemen. It must be stressed that although Bosnia is going through a dramatic economic   crisis   and   the destructions caused by the war are a  natural  catastrophe  of remarkable proportions, the militaries maintain that they should not be employed to help the Country in the reconstruction which, they insist, should be carried out by civilians. They also want a special daily allowance of about 25 DM, besides an insurance against possible incidents in which they may incur while clearing the mines they themselves had laid all over the territory.

At the same time, while complaining for the absolute lack of financial resources for the upkeep of men and materials, they go on training (especially the Serbs) on armoured vehicles, and immediately ask for fuel whenever they are called to intervene in favour of the civilian population.

According to the military point of view, the reductions are a social problem that ought to be fought in every possible way, safeguarding the existence of all Units by making generalized cuts. Another shifty and unconvincing method is the transition of the Units to the "cadre" or "reserve" position. Nevertheless,   it   must  be considered that the mobilization capability of Units and masses is well tested and very different from the way we understand it.

Furthermore, it will be necessary to discuss the number of the reserve "units" and the quantity of weapons stored in depots, in order to lower the threshold of a possible violence that could receive unlimited supplies from the storehouses of weapons, ammunition and explosives, whose number is out of proportion, compared to any reasonable defensive need.

In short, it seems appropriate to proceed, in the short term, to a further cut in the number of regulars, in order to reach a number of soldiers on duty in line with the standards of the western Nations and the real capabilities of the Country.

 

CONCLUSIONS

 

In Bosnia-Herzegovina there are not many architectural wounds that seem healed, while open and bleeding are all the wounds of unemployment, of an almost inexistent economy, of destroyed factories, of the political obtuseness of a great part of the old men-in-power, who do not want to give up their nationalist radicalism.

A few external and internal events offer some opportunities and increase the prospects of a possible greater stability in the region, but the very changes occurred in the FRY and in Croatia, not yet completely consolidated, appear as a potential danger of further regional crises.

Bosnia has reached a decisive stage. It has a series of opportunities that could make the difference if it were to act promptly and appropriately.

For a real change in BiH, the international Community should change its attitude and have an aggressive    approach    to reconstruction,  defining a common     strategy     of intervention     and    the concentration of efforts on certainly worthy objectives for the possible development of the Country.

If one continues to proceed in the same way, this opportunity will be lost and BiH will settle in a political status quo, with a worsening economy and with an international Community that continues to lose interest in it.

The moment could have come to reassess BiH's end state. The construction of a modem Country, with the standards envisaged for the Nations of Western Europe seems now impossible. A more correct position could be that of considering BiH an emerging Country of Eastern Europe. This outlook would permit a more appropriate comparison for the assessment   of   the   GNP, unemployment,  government structures, law and order, etc. This is a plan that could be carried out in the medium term.

Unfortunately BiH shows its incapacity to realize by itself the very urgent political, economic and social changes. A symptom of it is that the media, even more than the normal citizens, request a "protectorate"   for   Bosnia Herzegovina.

The optimists place their hopes in new elections, which could really evidence the real winners.

In the next year, the government of BiH has to show the international Community and its own people that it has achieved significant results in the institutional, political, economic and social sectors.

According to many observers "it's now or never".

G.R.

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